


KEYS

Kenya Youth Scenarios



Youth... the key to unlocking Kenya's potential



Institute of
Economic Affairs

KEYS

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Youth.... the key to unlocking Kenya's potential

Katindi Sivi-Njonjo & Dr. Mshai Mwangola

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Economic Affairs

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Section 1

About **IEA** and its **Scenarios** Work

The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA-Kenya) is Kenya's first public affairs dialogue forum. It seeks to promote pluralism of ideas through open, active and informed debate on public policy issues. The IEA-Kenya is independent of political parties, pressure groups, lobbies and any other partisan interests. In addition, the IEA-Kenya offers research backup to policy makers including Members of Parliament.

Through the Futures programme, the IEA-Kenya seeks to facilitate increased utilization of futures methodologies such as vision building, scenarios thinking and strategic planning in research and policy analysis in order to aid policy debate and public decision making processes.

The IEA-Kenya in collaboration with the Society for International Development (SID) in 1998 undertook a project on scenario building christened, 'Kenya at the Crossroads: Scenarios for Our Future'. Its aim was to catalyze dialogue on what possible futures Kenya could face over the next 10-15 years and stimulate debate about how to shape the next 2 decades of the country's life.

The team foresaw four possible outcomes: El Nino, a scenario of decline and disintegration as a result of no political or economic reforms; Maendeleo, an economic reform scenario, which forecast initial rapid gains but accompanied by severe inequalities and instability; Katiba, a scenario that saw institutional transformation as the key to reform, but which also depicted instability and little economic improvement; and Flying Geese, a scenario that involved simultaneous economic, political and institutional transformation of the country, resulting in inclusive democracy and economic growth.

During the dissemination phase of this project, the El-nino scenario was considered to be unnecessarily alarmist and was readily dismissed. The Maendeleo and Katiba scenarios were seen as the most practical alternatives

while the Flying geese story was deemed aspirational, perhaps utopian, yet there seemed to be a consensus that it represented the preferred model.

What were supposed to be 10 to 15 year projections began to be visible within 2 years of the project's completion. Between 2002 and 2007 the country witnessed a Maendeleo type of scenario where due to government's policies to revive the economy and create wealth, the country experienced accelerated economic growth from 0.6% in 2002 to 6.1% by the end of 2007. However, this growth was not shared thus creating deeper inequalities between regions and among people. The political elite were the biggest beneficiaries of this growth. A demand for political transformation through the constitutional reform process gave Kenya an opportunity to travel through the Katiba scenario. These efforts were thwarted when selfish interests carried the day and when the draft constitution was rejected in totality during the referendum. Kenya witnessed an El Nino type of scenario in the days and weeks following the announcement of the Presidential results in December 2007. Evidently, there was declining capacity of the state to provide security in certain parts of the country, hence the informalization and privatization of security arrangements that led to the legitimization of ethnic militias, escalating regional conflicts and gave rise to a highly militarized environment.

IEA's experience with scenarios building legitimizes the need to continue with more scenarios conversations around issues of mutual concern in order to be better prepared for any eventuality

What are Scenarios?



Human beings keep looking for certainty in a world that is fast changing and unpredictable. Indeed, no one knows what will happen and because there are no facts in the future, we can only imagine. Yet we rarely come together to systematically think about what future we might face. It would be good to plan for it based on sound information, or at least an educated guess.

Scenarios, which are stories about the future, help us think about various possibilities for the future systematically, to better navigate this uncertain world. They allow us to anticipate what might happen based on thorough research and acute intuitive insight to depict variables that are obvious, important and uncertain. By analyzing how these interact, one is able to understand and extrapolate different possibilities. People are then able to see how the world might turn out tomorrow and how we can adopt to those changes.

Scenarios also help us see the world from a broader perspective - beyond the proverbial '3'. Through the art of 're-perceiving' one can look at an issue from four dimensions. As a '3' but also as an 'E', a 'W' or as an 'M' depending on what angle you tilt the '3'. Through these diverse perspectives, participants of a scenarios exercise are able to allow themselves to imagine any kind of possibility in a non-threatening manner, hence an excellent tool to discuss complex issues.


It is important to note that scenarios are extrapolated probabilities and not predictions about the future.

What is 'Keys'?

In 2031, those aged between 15 and 34¹ today will be aged between 35 and 54 years old. They will constitute the bulk of the working age population, perhaps at the peak of their careers, running government, businesses, religious institutions, community projects and homes, with some approaching their retirement. They will reminisce about their past to their families and friends. We imagine that part of the re-count will be about whether the vision Kenya set out to accomplish 24 years earlier was achieved.

'Keys' - short for Kenya Youth Scenarios - is a project by young people aimed at extrapolating what that conversation might look like. IEA-Kenya used the scenarios building methodology to conduct research and analysis in order to understand various forces

at play in the youth sector, how they interact and what they may produce in the future. This booklet is therefore a documentation of what Kenya's youth perceive to be the possible scenarios Kenya will have to face by 2031.




¹ Kenya's constitution defines youth as all individuals in the republic who have attained the age of 18 years but have not attained the age of 35. The UN on the other hand defines youth as persons between the age of 15 and 24. Due to these varying descriptions of youth, the IEA in the scenarios building process has profiled youth as those aged between 15 and 34, in order to accommodate both categorizations

Why 'Keys'?

Every so often we talk about the number of young people idling in markets and street corners because of unemployment. We have complained about their inability to leave home and be self-reliant. We are disturbed by the rising alcohol and drug addiction among youth and are alarmed by their increasing participation in vigilante groups, militias and criminal gangs. We know majority of Kenya's youth are poor, marginalized and angry but perhaps we buried our heads in the sand as to how much. Until a disputed election occurred in 2007, the youth not only took the centre stage in the conflict, but they defined it beyond reacting to a stolen election. Through the ethnic, class and inter-generational war instigated by young people, it became clear that they could no longer continue to be relegated to the periphery. Other such reactions by young people globally for various reasons confirm that youth is an increasing vocal and visible phenomena.

This phenomenon presents complex challenges to all stakeholders and there are no easy answers as to how they can fully be addressed. With an increasing youth population that is relatively well educated, largely unemployed and in many ways marginalized, IEA felt an urgent need to catalyze dialogue around the possible futures Kenya might have to face. This was with the aim of designing appropriate policy interventions that would enable us to take advantage of the window of opportunity associated with youth bulges and to avert any negative outcomes that are associated with growing youth populations.

The **Journey!**



Research

Data was collected and analyzed in a book titled '*Youth Fact Book: Infinite Possibility or Definite Disaster?*' The book summarizes the status of youth in Kenya. It can be downloaded from [http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/documents/Very%20final%20Youth%20Fact%20Book%2014%20Dec%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/documents/Very%20final%20Youth%20Fact%20Book%2014%20Dec%20(2).pdf)

Extensive research was carried out in the following thematic areas: demographics; un/employment; access to education; quality of education; health; family development; political participation; vigilantism; crime; entertainment; and sports. The researches gave a description of past trends which have contributed to the present state of affairs; identified driving forces which are shaping the present and/or are expected to shape the future; examined the current assumptions about the future; highlighted opportunities and risks that arise from the current patterns of events; as well as examined existing policies, their gaps and policy recommendations. These findings are published in the *Youth Research Compendium*.

Scenarios Building

Kenya's young people are not homogenous. For this reason, scenarios teams were convened in all the eight provinces to eliminate the usual concentration of such conversations in urban areas, thus marginalizing important voices in other regions.

The teams were facilitated to carry out scenarios discussions and they met in nine (9) workshops, each lasting one week, convened over a period of approximately six months. The meetings entailed: knowledge sharing - the knowledge gathered in the research phase has presented in order to enhance understanding of the transactional environment; test assumptions; understand the inescapables and uncertainties; help agree on the focal question and identify driving forces that would shape the future.

Participants then constructed possible scenarios for Kenya from their regional perspectives. The information from the nine workshops was collated and a select group of young people from each region were convened in a tenth workshop to analyze the output from all the regions and deliberate on a consolidated set of scenarios for Kenya.

Dissemination

There has been an on-going communication process of the Youth Fact Book produced in phase 1. The scenarios stories and the Youth Research Compendium will be used both as a dissemination facilitating tool and as a strategy tool.



As a dissemination facilitating tool

The research and the scenarios products will be used to catalyze dialogue around issues of mutual concern to youth stakeholders in order to understand what they had not understood before.


As a strategy tool

The research and the scenarios stories will be used to extract policy proposals. Within groups, the information will be used to work out strategies that would enable them to respond more strategically.



The 'Keys' Hypothesis

As women in Kenya continue to give birth later, to fewer children, and as they space them more, the transition from a child-rich to a bulging youth population (which is yet to peak) is inevitable. It means that a significant portion of the population is potentially available to take on the responsibilities of providing for a nation – materially, politically and socially.



This bulge can be Kenya's greatest asset or Kenya's biggest burden!

The ‘inescapables²’ by 2030³

1. A shrinking population of 0-14 year olds from 43% in 2010 to 38%.
2. An increasing population of 15-34 year olds hence an increasing working age population of 15-64 year-olds from 55% to 59%.
3. Fertility rates are expected to decrease from 4.6 in 2009 to about 3.7 children per woman thus decreasing the dependency ratio of children from 82 in 2010 to 70.
4. Population annual growth rate is expected to reduce from 2.7% to 2.2%. However, because a big proportion of the population is in their reproductive age, a population increase from 40 million people in 2010 to 65.9 million people is expected.
5. Fewer children will be dying at birth (Infant Mortality Rate is expected to decrease from 52 to 44 children per 1000).
6. Fewer children will be dying before their 5th birthday (under-five mortality rates are expected to decrease from 74 in 2009 to 63 children per 1000).
7. The median age⁴ of Kenyans will rise from the current 18 years to 21 years.
8. People will live longer (life expectancy at birth will increase from 54 in 2009 to 63 years old).
9. An aging population where 65+ will increase from 2.7% to 3.5%.


2 Inescapables are things we will have to face whether we like it or not. They are those aspects of the future we cannot avoid. All data in this section, unless stated otherwise, is analyzed from the United Nations World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision (2007), retrieved November 04, 2011 from http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/unpp/panel_population.htm

3 Kenya in 2007 unveiled Kenya Vision 2030, a government blue print aimed at transforming the country into a middle income country.

4 Age that divides the population in two parts of equal size, that is, there are as many persons with ages above the median as there are with ages below the median.

What the **'inescapables'** mean if we do nothing!

1. Average economic performance of countries with young populations is 3.6%
2. Countries with youthful populations that are relatively well educated and are unemployed have a 26% probability of getting into a civil conflict. This probability increases by 150% if the youth population peaks.





Section 2

How we **define** ourselves and how others define us!

Those who blame this generation should remember who raised it'



We used various adjectives and phrases to define ourselves and to define how others see us. These included words like: the majority; fresh and dynamic; a mind-set (you are as young as you feel or think); unemployed; techno savvy; risk takers; creative, diverse and innovative; easily manipulated; lacking an identity; criminals; good social networkers; drug abusers; excluded from formal decision making processes; categorized into a poor majority and a rich minority; unreligious; transitional stage from childhood to adulthood (though there is need to clarify when childhood ends and when adulthood begins because this differs from one culture to another); unsettled and constantly in transition (including when it comes to jobs, boy/girl relationships or in education).

Daring because they do not have family and other life's responsibilities; desperate due to many unmet needs; generally misunderstood by the older generation and are therefore constantly viewed negatively; rowdy and often clustered as troublemakers; energetic; economically challenged; adventurous; considered immature; seen as a market by entrepreneurs; a cheap source of labor; as those who pursue instant gratification; bullies; cool; unutilized potential; needy; no interest in agriculture; vigilantes, gangs and militias; creative; chaotic; celebrities; entertaining; hard headed; children; criminals; suspects; as needing guidance and advice; manipulated.

They are seen as a threat especially to the political elite; non-conformists; unstable; heretics; mischievous; marginalized; easily enticed; those who are not married; sexually active and morally decadent; lack financial and entrepreneurial skill; conditioned to white collar jobs than self employment; used and abused; ignorant; fear responsibility; constant volunteers; idle; disillusioned; hopeful; frustrated; not tribal; leaders of tomorrow; conservative; balkanized; greatest consumers of foreign culture; as those who idolize celebrities and on, and on.

Our current **reality**

From the Youth Fact Book (which can be accessed from [http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/documents/Very%20final%20Youth%20Fact%20Book%202014%20Dec%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.ieakenya.or.ke/documents/Very%20final%20Youth%20Fact%20Book%202014%20Dec%20(2).pdf)) our current realities include:

Demographics

Is currently the
second highest
population cohort


Responsible
for 80% of the
1 million Kenyans
produced every
year

will be the highest
population cohort in
the next 10-15 years

Highest migrants




Health



Education

High access to primary school, low access to secondary, tertiary & university education

Low transition, retention & completion rates at secondary school level



Low teacher pupil ratio, corruption in education sector, too donor funded

Low quality education that is not as relevant to the job market

Family

Parents
too busy; changing
family structure
& roles

Early marriages
(by 19, 36% of girls are
already mothers)



Retrogressive
cultural practices like
FGM

Increasing gender
violence

Un/employment

Mostly unemployed or underemployed

High child labour



Mostly unskilled or under skilled

Not fully accessing Youth Enterprise Development Fund

ICT


Main use of ICT especially new media like internet and social media

Not optimally used for innovation and economic development

Presenting complex challenges like cyber crime and value related issues



Participation



Crime

Young men
are main perpetrators
of crime

Escalation of new
crimes like fraud and
cyber crime




instant
generation

The **contradictions** and the **assumptions** we have been making!

Fallacy	Reality
Religious and cultural norms are still strong among us	We are strongly influenced by westernization, especially in urban areas
We are 'wakosa mila' ⁵	Cultural ties and practices, even the negative ones still play an integral part of our lives, especially in rural areas
Wife battering is always instigated by the men	More young women expect to be beaten by their husbands for minor mistakes like burning food or arguing with him.
Media is always a credible source of information for us e.g. when they portray Central Province as leading in alcohol consumption but factually Western province is leading and Central province is number 4. The Problem in central is the quality of the content they consume which has devastating effects	Media can be skewed in its outlook. there is need for us to be more analytical about the information we consume
HIV/AIDs was the biggest killer disease because of the awareness raising campaigns	There are 7 million Kenyans infected with Herpes (the simplex virus) which is 17.5% of the population! Due to risky sexual behavior, STI infections are also very high among us
We all want formal jobs	Formal employment is only growing at 2%
Urban areas had the best facilities such as jobs	Unemployment is higher in rural than in urban areas
The more educated young people are, the more likely they are to make the responsible reproductive health choices	The more educated young people are, the more they are likely to engage in risky sexual behaviour
We will actively voice injustices	We are apathetic to issues that do not affect us. We are not quick to take personal responsibility. We often wait for someone else to fix it!
The more educated, the better your life will be. Some of the most successful people do not have a university degree. They have used their talents to succeed.	A combination of education and talent is likely to yield better results
We are producing more graduates than ever before	Most young people graduating from colleges are functionally illiterate
Success is holistic	Success to us is equated to having a good job. Good health, happiness etc are not a priority

5 Is a Kiswahili word for people whose cultural subscription is weak

Past Trends⁶ that inform the present!



Source: Scenarios building workshops PESTEL exercises

This is a political, economic, social, technological, ecological and legal summary of major trends of change we perceived to have occurred over time and have had a significant influence on the present state of affairs. We also needed to determine which of these variables would continue having a major impact in the future and which ones would fizzle out as important drivers for the future.

⁶ These trends show the general inclination of important drivers in the past. They are not drawn to scale but to give a pictorial view of whether there was increase or decrease and roughly at what point this change may have occurred.

The **Organizing Question**

The guiding question was




**How will the
youth shape the
future of Kenya?**

The question was not: what will the future of the youth be in Kenya or even, what might the future of Kenya look like – but what role the youth might play in influencing Kenya's future.

In answering the organizing question, as regional teams we discussed the biggest concerns and prioritized the factors that would be most critical in defining our future.

As a result, different drivers of the future emerged from every region, emphasizing the fact that we are not a homogenous group. We face different challenges and priorities for the future.



Regional Conversations about our Concerns & Possible Future Drivers⁷!

The sentiments captured below are those expressed during the scenarios building workshops. An attempt has been made to remain true to the expressions made

⁷ Some of the names given to the scenarios stories are invented by the participants and may not exist in English.


North Eastern Province

- We are marginalized and have limited access to basic rights like acquiring national identity cards, education, water and healthcare.
- The Kenyan education system is not pastoralist friendly. We feel this has always been intentional marginalization since independence, with the drawing of Sessional Paper No. 10 to support an agricultural based economy.
- Historical injustices such as the Wagala Massacre have not been addressed, yet when the rest of Kenya experienced the Post Election Violence (PEV), swift action was taken to address the situation.
- The cancellation of the Census results for parts of North Eastern confirms the rest of Kenya's attitude and marginalization towards us. The government needs to explain why results were cancelled.
- We experience constant harassment and discrimination especially from the Kenyan police who often label us as *foreigners* mainly because they cannot differentiate between Kenyan Somalis and Somalis from Somalia.
- Being a Kenyan Somali is extremely burdensome. We always have to justify our citizenship! Circumstances sometimes force us to register ourselves as refugees. After all, it is easier than being a Kenyan
- Low education levels, high poverty levels and prolonged unemployment is making us very desperate. Some of our friends and family members have been forced to join *Al-Shabaab*⁸ with the promise of a luxurious life. Unfortunately, we keep burying the young men.
- Our religion and culture are significantly intertwined. It influences the way we think and act. Because family planning is prohibited in the Islamic religious practice, and children are given by God, we shall have as many children as God gives.
- This region generates so much wealth through the livestock industry and Eastleigh is an economic herb. Why has the government never acknowledged or factored in this contribution in a formal way?
- The government has left the refugee crisis for us to handle
- If Somalia were peaceful today, we would request for a referendum like Southern Sudan, and secede.



⁸ a terrorist military group in Somalia that is said to have proliferated North Eastern Province in Kenya

In crafting four possible outcomes, the most critical drivers for our future are governance and access to relevant and quality education.



*Sharmaarke*⁹ is the story of high investment in quality and relevant education in the region, through the county governments, over a long period. This eventually translates into good leadership and efficient service delivery. Poverty is reduced and the region develops thus relinquishing its status as a marginalized region.

Oasis in the desert is a story of continued marginalization but with good leadership and persistence the region eventually thrives. Teacher: student ratios and the doctor: patient ratios are particularly high. With time, the region attracts sufficient social sector funding from traditional donors due to transparent leadership thus improving the human development index in the region.

*Shida Estate*¹⁰ is the story of high access to relevant and quality education due to government's provision of free primary education (FPE) and subsidized secondary education. There are also a lot of scholarships available for youth from marginalized communities. However, corruption in the leadership clique, nepotism and clanism influences who gets these opportunities causing conflict and deep clan divisions over these resources.

Continued poor leadership and low access to relevant and quality education keeps the population poor and promotes impunity, lawlessness and violence. Inadequate employment opportunities push young people to join criminal gangs and terror groups hence the realization of a *Matangari*¹¹ state.


9. Is a Borana word for one who will never see trouble

10. A Kiswahili word for problems


11. A Kikuyu word for tatters

Coast Province

- We feel angry at the fact that all the revenue collected from here does not benefit us. It all goes to Nairobi.
- The Port of Lamu and some of the communal land there has already been privatized by the so called reformists.
- Political heavy weights and politically correct tribes in Mpeketoni have legal ownership of land while the indigenous people don't! Why?
- We feel particularly insulted by the proposition to re-settle internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Taita Taveta. How can they resettle other people here when we (the indigenous people) live on only 11% of the land because the rest is owned by a few individuals and occupied by the national park? How can we be rendered squatters in their own land?
- We are becoming resentful of people from the mainland, popularly referred to as Watu wa Bara. They stereotype us as 'lazy', then come and take up all the jobs, even the most basic ones like sweeping hotel floors. How are we going to provide for our families if we cannot find employment in our own region?
- When we protest against these injustices, the political class hatches a ploy to incapacitate us (especially the young men) through drugs in order to block us from questioning. When we propose to 'leave' Kenya, they wage war against us and call us terror groups.
- "The Coast is a 'hot bed'. We will not continue to tolerate this. We shall not rest until justice prevails!"



The most important drivers for our future are: the land tenure system and political leadership.



Shamba la Wanyama¹² is a story of an attempt to reform the land tenure system through the constitution and various land legislation. However, big businesses and the land owners use their political influence to sabotage the process through their gate keepers, the county leaders. This leads to recurring protests, violence and counter attacks.

Admitting that the future is bleak if the land question is not addressed, **Pambazuko**¹³ State is the story of a county leadership that is determined to go against all odds to reform land issues in the Province. The leadership collaborates to address the historical land injustices using both traditional mechanisms and the judicial system. It also works at creating a diverse means of livelihood thus easing off the demand for land among young people who are the majority.

Kaa Ngumu¹⁴ Republic is the story of a county leadership that tries to quell the disgruntled population of youth through land reforms at the county level. However, the leadership quickly realizes that there are bigger and more powerful forces at work at the national level. Their efforts are thwarted and they fail in resolving the issues

Zaa Zaa¹⁵ State is the story of a very punitive county government elected to protect the interests of big businesses and the political elite. On realizing that the 'wenye inchi'¹⁶ will not relent, inertia sets in among young people. They resign to their fate saying 'liwe liwalo'¹⁷.

12 a Kiswahili word for animal farm

13 a Kiswahili word meaning dawn

14 a Kiswahili phrase which can be used to mean, keep resisting the pressure

15 Corrupted Kiswahili for Kizaazaa meaning trouble or misfortune

16 a Kiswahili word literary translated to 'the owners of the country'

17 a Kiswahili word for whatever will be, will be


Central Province



- We feel like we have to pay the price for Kikuyu dominance in the country. In fact, we feel that the problem of illicit brew in central province is a deliberate attempt to reduce Kikuyu dominance in the country.
- The fact that women and young girls in some parts of the region are having to be paid to give birth means that in a few years, we will no longer be the majority in the county.
- Poverty is also driving most of us (especially young men) out of school to work in tea and coffee plantations and earn an income. Proximity to Nairobi¹⁸ and unemployment facilitates the easy joining of criminal gangs.
- One way of numbing our frustrations is the drinking of illicit brew. This has led to many broken families. It is also reinforcing the single mother phenomenon and the strong mother figureheads. Inverse gender violence is also a reality of in the region.

18 Kenya's capital city

In determining the possible futures for this region, we are most concerned about the level of integration and use of technology versus the quality of governance institutions.



E-Kamukunji is a story of strong governance institutions that have been built over time due to the constant vigilance and demand for accountability by the citizens. However, the pace of implementation has been extremely slow due to low integration and use of technology.

Sizeable investments in modern technology compliment strong governance structures in the region due to checks and balances instituted by the citizens. This accelerates development and propels the region to remarkable levels of economic stability and political maturity. That is the story of ***Kenya Pap***¹⁹!

Technotard Republic is a story of a technologically advanced region that facilitates anarchy due to the presence of many techno savvy but unemployed youth in an environment with weak institutions hence reversing the economic gains realized over time.

Matambara²⁰ ***State*** is a region that has completely disintegrated and is irrelevant in the modern society due to weak governance institutions and low integrated use of technology.

¹⁹ This is slung for instant

²⁰ Kikuyu word that means tatters or torn pieces of cloth


Eastern Province



- It is important to note that Eastern Province is a cosmopolitan area. The challenges we face as young people are therefore diverse. As Kamba youth, witchcraft is still a very important cultural practice and it co-exists with modernity. Due to unemployment, many of us (especially young women) flock lorry transporting centers in the region or move to urban areas and engage in transactional sex as a source of income.
- We the Embu and Meru youth, large scale farming of *Miraa* (Khat)²¹ is big business and a source of employment for youth in the region. The government should elevate the status of *Miraa* to a cash crop so that it becomes a major income generating activity for us, as we would increase the supply for export to big markets like North Eastern, Nairobi, Somalia and the Middle East. We would like an airport built in the region to facilitate more efficient transportation of *Miraa* in the region.
- However we admit that it is important to balance the economic value of the crop versus the moral outlook of planting *Miraa* as promotion of drug abuse.

²¹ There are different types of *Miraa* like Kangeta (long one), Allele, Kagiza and Muguka also known as Ketepa (which is the cheapest and the most common type of *Miraa* sold in Nairobi).

As youth from Eastern Province, we feel that the dictators of our future will be governance and unemployment.



Ujamaa kwa Jam²² is the story of very good governance but in an environment with high unemployment necessitating government investment in social programmes to cater for the social welfare of the numerous unemployed citizens, a model that slows economic growth and in many ways cannot be sustained over a long period of time.

Just like **Shaka Zulu**²³ united many of the Northern Nguni people due to his statesmanship, military, social innovation and vigor, young people's meaningful participation in governance processes positively affects quality of leadership that results into economic growth and translates into provision of jobs.

Unyonga²⁴ is a story of very talented and innovative young people who focus their energy on wealth creation while ignoring the state of governance in the region. Unfortunately, those bad institutions reverse their gains and their apparent success is only an illusion.

Maisha²⁵ **QaQabato**²⁶ is a story of a failed state where its citizens are poor and literary live from hand to mouth due to bad governance and high unemployment.

22 The phrase when literary translated refers to 'a stuck community'

23 South African name of a famous Zulu King

24 Is a corrupted Kiswahili word that should read Kinyonga, which stands for a chameleon

25 Is a Kiswahili word for life


26 Is a Borana word for Hand to Mouth

Western Province



- Because of the cultural reference to traditional brew as 'porridge', we start drinking alcohol from very young ages. This affects our schooling.
- Interestingly, the highest expectation for us from our parents and our community is to become teachers. This somehow makes us mediocre and curtails our ability to dream bigger.
- Bull fighting, though a cultural pride in this region also promotes a culture of violence.
- As young women of this area, we feel particularly disadvantaged by certain cultural practices that hinder us from political participation. Traditionally, we do not have a youth identity because when we are unmarried, the community views us as children who cannot 'address' elders and ask for votes. When we get married, young women 'belong' to their husbands. We are no longer youth but adults. We therefore cannot vie for political seats on a youth ticket even when we are within that age bracket. It becomes more complicated if we are married into a different clan from our parents' clan because we are viewed as 'foreigners'. We also cannot garner votes from our parent's side because we are considered to have 'left'.

Even though culture and political patronage present great challenges, we feel that the most important drivers for our future will be technology and access to relevant and quality education.



Mlala hoi²⁷ is a story of young people with low relevant and quality education who have very little access to and use of technology. As a result, they are not able to work and effectively live in a fast changing global environment

Nyapara²⁸ is a story of young people who have very high access to relevant and quality education. However, the government restricts access and use of technology, specifically social media in order to restrict any possibilities of social upheaval by youth.

Khubukhe²⁹ is the story of an empowered community due to high investments in access to relevant and quality education that leads to high access and use of modern technology that enhances economic growth.

Chwadrok³⁰ is a story that presents an interesting contradiction. A big proportion of the youth population is semi-illiterate but they have easy access and highly use modern technology, specifically social media leading to many missed opportunities on one hand while on the other, a misuse of information.

27 Is a Kiswahili phrase that can be literary translated to mean a poor person

28 Is a Kiswahili word for supervisor

29 Is a Luhya word for lets wake up

30 Is a Luo word for fighting


Nyanza Province



- Kenyan politics at the level of top leadership has been dominated by a handful of communities and it is time others got an equal chance to lead.
- PM Raila Odinga, whose family has dominated Nyanza politics, probably has his last chance of becoming the country's President during the 2012 elections. If he does not make it, the dominance that the Odinga family has enjoyed in Luo Nyanza is likely to wane.
- The implementation of the constitution is critical in defining the future of this country.
- We have to *guoyo dala*³¹ at a very young age because of the early death of most parents due to AIDS. As a result, many homes are headed by children or grandparents, a factor that is affecting the socio-economic development of the region.

31 Build houses in their parents homestead

As youth from Nyanza, we are most concerned about constitutionalism and the cost of living based on the type of economy driving the future



Punglu Pangala³² is the story of a leadership that does not adhere to the constitution. This poor leadership also affects the economic performance and restricts diversity. Only the political elite and foreign investors have access to the bulk of the country's wealth. Majority of the young people are unemployed, disillusioned and tired of the status quo. They result into violence

GMO³³ **Republic** is a state where the leadership has high adherence to the constitution. This creates an environment conducive for foreign investments. This creates opportunities for young people to economically thrive, mainly through innovation and increased technology.

As much as there is high adherence to the constitution, the traditional small scale informal production dominates the economy. Low foreign exchange earnings from the export of raw agricultural products coupled with low innovation leads to a weakening shilling, high number of imports and the slow improvement in the standards of living. Poverty levels increase among the majority of the population hence the **Popcorn Republic**.

Kwekwe³⁴ **Scenario** is a story of a state of anarchy due to a dictatorial regime that has low adherence to the constitution and a riotous youth that protests this type of leadership. This is exacerbated by traditional small scale and informal agricultural production that the youth deem uninteresting and irrelevant hence high poverty and unemployment among them.

32 A Luo word used to express the sound made by an item that has fallen

33 Acronym for Genetically Modified Organisms


34 Is a Luo word for Hyacinth

Rift Valley³⁵ Province



- Given that the region has ethnic diversity, the key determinants of the future include the extent to which this diversity is factored into the political participation. Land ownership is another key driver.

³⁵ The facilitator of the Rift Valley scenarios exercise felt that the issues raised in the workshop and the eventual scenarios built were not reflective of the concerns of the region. This was largely due to the participants' mix, most of who were from Nairobi. The facilitator's sentiments were later confirmed through wide consultation of opinion leaders in the region. As a result, the scenarios stories reflected here are not the original outcomes of the Rift Valley workshop but what the Rift valley opinion shapers agreed upon.



Bandaptai³⁶ is a scenario where communal land injustices are addressed through comprehensive land reforms, ending communal grievances. Land is eventually privately owned on the basis of willing buyer, willing seller. Adoption of modern technological farming methods and agro-processing, lead to high productivity, high profit margins and improved quality of life. There is also stability and security due to resolved historical land issues.

Misri³⁷ is a story of communal ownership of land with acrimonious protection of these resources as well as conflict in some cases over who owns what. Politics of exclusion lead to mass exodus of non indigenous communities. It is a replay of 1992, 1997 and 2007 land and election clashes.

Bogoria³⁸ is a story of very slow growth as a result of ethnic dominance in the private ownership of land. Other communities not considered indigenous are excluded causing inter and intra ethnic divisions that results to mass exodus and increased numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Political zoning escalates increasing the number of vigilante groups that are formed to protect communal interests. Government institutions protect certain interests, alienating others hence slowed productivity leading to a food crisis in the country.

Suguta³⁹ is a scenario of nepotism and the suppression of minority communities leading to high inequality and explosive ethnic tensions.

³⁶ Bandap is a Kalenjin word meaning journey and Tai means ahead. The phrase is used here to mean 'a journey to prosperity'.

³⁷ A Kiswahili word for Egypt

³⁸ Is a name of a place in Kenya with hot water springs due to volcanic geysers


³⁹ Suguta Marmar is a valley in Marakwet. It is a very difficult terrain to navigate causing cattle rustling to thrive.

Nairobi Province



- Globalization and technology is imperative for us now and in the future. It is already providing unprecedented opportunities. However the inequality among us is a big concern.

As youth from Nairobi, we feel that the interconnectedness of globalization and technology and the level of young people's public participation are going to be the main drivers of our future.



Majimbo⁴⁰ State is the story of high public participation in an environment where there is localized disorder. Many young people are inward looking and thus involved in vigilante activities as a way of protecting their own.

Due to improved quality of life, **Mamlaka**⁴¹ Lane is in many ways, the story of a successful nation but with high wealth disparities. While the rich dominate political participation to protect their interests, the rest are passive recipients of development. They believe 'if it ain't broken don't fix it'.

Usonko⁴² Digital Generation is a story of innovation and very high technological advancements that facilitate borderless communities. The youth are the drivers of this development and as a result, they fully participate in the national, economic and social life. However, they have to deal with new challenges that have never occurred before.

Mamluki⁴³ is a failed state. The rise of dictatorship and chieftaincy leads people to retreat to their tribal cocoons. They self organize in vigilante groups to protect themselves from external attacks. There is extreme apathy about public life and a total breakdown of the country.


As university students from Nairobi, unemployment and technology are the most important drivers of our future.

40 is a Kiswahili word for decentralized

41 is a Kiswahili word for status

42 Is a slang word, sonko, which could mean rich or 'the boss'

43 Swahili word for mercenary



Gagnagagna⁴⁴ is the story of relatively low unemployment due to government's effort to address the issue. Technological advancement has stagnated causing young people's indifference.

Chillax⁴⁵ **Scenario** is the story of a government that invests heavily in technology thus reducing unemployment to low levels. Young people are relaxed as they no longer have to worry too much about finding a job.

Menlagious⁴⁶ **Scenario** is the story of high integration of technology in an environment where young people are not very well educated. They have minimal skills to work in a technologically advanced workplace. Investors, due to their profit making motive, replace people with machines leading to high unemployment levels. Young people have little to celebrate.

Fullu Fullu⁴⁷ **State** is the story of a leadership that buries its head in the sand. It does not invest adequately in technology neither does it provide a conducive environment for job creation. After twenty years, Kenya is a desolate example of a country, a pale shadow of its former self.

44 Word invented by the group

45 Slung word that means relax

46 Word invented by the group

47 is a kikuyu word that means being in a hopeless state



Section 3

Building a national set of scenarios

Future **Driving Forces**

The underlying understanding here is that there are other important factors that will be driving the future of Kenya but do not emerge as priorities to us. The driving forces and their key factors capture the issues we have considered as important in the coming two decades. These include:

Culture

- An identity crisis about who we are and role confusion
- Retrogressive cultural practices
- The contradictions presented by traditional versus modern lifestyles.
- Youth culture
- The clash between religion and culture
- Polygamy and polyandry
- Misinformation or lack of information about other tribes

Governance

- Clan politics
- Weak institutions
- Poor leadership
- Inadequate representation in parliament of youth and especially young women
- Manipulation/tokenism/decoration
- Increased agitation by marginalized groups for participation
- High expectations of the new constitution
- County governments
- Balkanization of Kenya's ethnic groups
- Secession (Mombasa, North Eastern)
- Tribalism
- Corruption
- Sizeable voter block
- System change in the judiciary
- Historical injustice
- Government resources
- Regionalization vs. globalization
- Apathy
- Mistrust of national institutions such as the police

Religion

- Decreased influence of religion
- Youth more irreligious
- Clashes between culture and religion

Values

- Glamour is significantly influential
- Image is everything
- Individualistic
- Instant gratification

Agriculture and agribusiness

- Miraa farming elevated to acash crop
- GMOs
- Irrelevance of traditional, small scale farming to us
- Land issues in Rift valley and Coast Provinces
- Hunger and food insecurity
- Livestock farming

Technology

- Not optimally used
- Mobile technology
- Technological Advancement
- Computer gaming
- Too much information to be digested in a short time
- Internet
- Social media

Education

- Is without values
- Low quality
- No longer translates into better life
- Not pastoralist friendly
- Is a measure of memory and not a measure of intelligence
- Low completion, retention and transition
- High access to primary education
- Low access to secondary, technical and university education

Family

- Changing gender roles
- Changing family structure
- Early marriages
- Sexual minorities
- High expectation for gender violence
- Parents are too busy to parent

Demographics

- High rural and urban migrants
- High population (Political aspect, religious aspect, economic reality)
- Shrinking children and bulging youth
- Global population increase

Urbanization

- Urbanization causing diversity

Health

- Redefinition of drugs to include new ones
- Youth responsible for high birth rates
- Lifestyle diseases
- Reproductive health challenges and risky sexual behaviour
- Narco-politics
- High drug and alcohol abuse
- High HIV and STI infection

Global / Regional issues

- China factor (control economy, raw material, trade, democracy and human rights)
- Changing role of other donors
- Arab spring/ revolution
- South Sudan
- Climate change
- Global economic crisis, global youth unemployment and global inequality
- Somalia - Piracy, terrorism, refugee influx and the 'Eastleigh' factor
- Energy (Oil crisis)
- Global politics and conflict resolution
- Terrorism and other transnational organized crimes like money laundering, narcotics
- Regionalism (EAC, AU, COMESA)
- Refugee influx
- Science and Technology such as social media and space exploration
- Global health - disease- avian flu, Sexual and reproductive health, drug abuse

The economy

- High unemployment
- National inequality
- High cost of living


- Poverty
- Organizations down sizing
- Un/under skilled
- High child labour
- Underemployment

Crime

- Transnational organized crime e.g. terrorism
- Youth main perpetrators of crime
- Proliferation of vigilante, militia and gangs
- Resource based conflict

Over-arching **drivers** that anchor the scenarios stories

To identify the most important critical uncertainties, we clustered the all the future driving forces on the basis of the degree of impact and the degree of uncertainty and eventually chose the bi-polar variables that would be used to anchor the stories.




Source: Youth scenarios discussions

After much discussion and soul searching, we agreed on demographics, more specifically the level of equality of the youth demographic, versus governance, specifically the extent of our political participation now and in the future.

These are the bi-polar variables onto which the stories are anchored.

Demographics

The sector of the population identified officially as youth is an increasing vocal and visible phenomena of the national reality. The bracket of Kenyans aged 15 – 35 years currently comprises well over a third of the country's population, and is set to increase as the country moves from a child-rich population to a youth bulge. This has implications for the nation in terms of meeting the needs of this demographic – particularly with regard to the provision of social services such as health and education.



Currently there is high youth investment with regard to participation in political, economic and social processes. This has been most visible in terms of the increased numbers actively campaigning for and embracing available opportunities in these areas. In the last general election, this found expression in the slogan “Vijana tugutuke” which saw a huge voter turnout from this sector of the population. On the other hand, the it was also youth who became the face of the perpetrators in the ensuing post-election violence, even

as it was argued that it was older generations who bore the responsibility for instigating, planning and resourcing the violence. Thus, the increased participation must be measured not only in terms of quantity (how many youth have access to opportunities) but also quality (to what extent this access extends to influence, resources and meaningful participation). We argue that the nation has not paid attention to the latter as much as it has to the former, which begs the question as to what extent youth are truly able to influence the direction that Kenya will go in the next twenty years.

The new constitution, in paying attention to the question of affirmative action benefiting youth, has opened up new avenues for youth participation in processes and institutions of governance, creating opportunities denied previous generations of independence era Kenyan youth. However, most opportunities for youth participation are in “youth” movements, “wings”, positions, institutions, programmes and processes, and there is a question as to what extent youth – even those in decision-making positions - are engaged in a tokenistic manner.

Level of equality

Level of equality manifests in different ways, most notably with regard to access to resources, opportunities, and social services.

Identity matters in Kenya; ancestral roots, religion, geo-political location and identification; age, gender, social and economic status – all these influence the realities that different Kenyans have to deal with. Political power is inextricably linked to the social and economic benefits of being a citizen. The relationship between who has power and who benefits from state resources is played out in identity discourses, making these factors critical determinants of individual's chances of success in life. The level of equality affects both communities and individuals, affecting perceptions of belonging to the nation and the sense of responsibility and entitlement amongst the youth.



Although “the youth” is often imagined as a undifferentiated mass, in reality there is wide diversity contained within this congregation. It is important to note that while some youth are certainly more marginalized than others, the perception of marginalization (for different reasons) with regard to the rest of Kenyan society unites almost all who identify as youth in Kenya. In general, the identity of “youth” is as weighted down with low expectations, negative perceptions and a range of obstacles, as much as it is gifted with the potential to achieve what preceding generations could only dream about. It is a complex and volatile combination, which, when fuelled by the demographic factor cited above, can be the most influential catalyst in determining the direction Kenya will go.

The three areas of opportunity for youth in Kenya today are in the political, economic and social realm. Each of these offers possibilities for youth intervention that would have tangible impact in shifting the narrative of Kenya in significant ways.


The most significant factors in the political realm are the lingering consequences of the post-2007 elections violence (PEV); the growing participation by the youth in political processes despite, or perhaps because of, the ambivalence that youth feel towards the state; and the onset of a new constitutional dispensation beginning August 2010. The identification of the youth as constituting the majority of PEV perpetrators points to the larger problem of a disenfranchised, disillusioned youth seeking alternatives to state-sanctioned and / or legal avenues where these seem to have been illegally captured by forces they cannot effectively challenge. The challenge in this regard is to provide realistic avenues to transform this cynicism and frustration into hope and confidence in the possibilities of a better future.

The promulgation of the new constitution has given new impetus to the dream of a new Kenya where the glaring imbalances of the present are redressed. However, the uncertainty of implementation, not just if, but to what extent the spirit of the 2010 constitution will be translated from paper to life, will continue to dominate the next two decades. Historically marginal and marginalized communities – including that amorphous constituency identifying as the youth - continue to struggle to assert their rights to state resources. There is a drive to not only ensure such communities are no longer denied their rights as Kenyan citizens, but that they are given a fair chance to “catch up” with the rest of the country. Attempts at institutionalizing and transforming governance mechanisms and processes in Kenya, particularly when these require a form of affirmative action, are however facing a robust fight-back from those who have benefited from the status quo. The challenge for the next two decades is to entrench a culture of constitutionalism in the Kenya.

Discourse in the economic realm is dominated by high rates of unemployment and an increasing shrinking of opportunities in the formal economy – the civil service and the private sector - the employment mainstay of preceding generations. Although real opportunities lie in the informal sector whose rapid growth in the last decade makes it the frontier for economic success for the youth, there is a frustrating lack of access to factors of production and the resources – financial and otherwise – needed to actualize this potential. Agriculture, once Kenya’s mainstay, has all but lost its luster for the youth, the majority of whom desire to be part of the nation’s fast-growing urban population. ICT – particularly with regard to digitized media – is the new area of emphasis. However imbalances in access to the necessary infrastructure particularly inhabitants of rural Kenya and those living in low-income urban settlements - many of who still do have access to basic services such as electricity – restricts its potential to a select minority. The test here would be to facilitate a diversification of the economy and the facilitation of alternative / new / neglected opportunities expanding the possibilities available to youth beyond the narrow realms of formal sector.

The social realm has to take into account the massive social inequalities reflected in regional, gender, geographical, economic and other indicators that have resulted in the fierce identity-defined competition for limited public resources. Two particular areas of concern in this regard are access to quality education and adequate health services. It is perhaps in these two, more than anywhere else, that the effects on youth with regard to regional and class inequalities are at their most evident. Those who have no choice about the matter forced to make do with deteriorating, under-resourced, overwhelmed facilities. There is – arguably as a direct consequence – a ballooning number of youth falling victim to the consequences of irresponsible / unhealthy lifestyle choices; a spiraling crime rate characterized more and more by violence; and the evolving menace of youth vigilante groups in all their diversity. There is also pressure on social institutions, such as the family, and formal religious and educational institutions, interact in the making of a rapidly evolving Kenyan society whose values are drawn from indigenous and exogenous sources, reaching both to the past and the future. The resultant mix, like elsewhere, is sometimes fraught with tension and confusion, even as it increasingly reflects the vibrant and diverse population that is Kenya's greatest asset. Whether Kenya will remain fractured along the fault lines of inequality or reconciled as critical imbalances are redressed, remains to be seen.

Finally, we acknowledge the current status where despite their numbers and visibility youth have little effective decision-making influence in these different realms, and where few are being actively and consciously facilitated through participation and mentoring to take on the responsibility of shaping Kenya's future. Each of the following stories therefore begins from the reality of a marginalized youth population and grapples with the possibilities that emerge from the diverse ways in which this population engages the national story.



Scenario Story 1:


Like a tsunami (which is a series of water waves caused by disturbances from earthquakes, volcanic eruptions or underwater explosions above or below water to generate rapidly rising tides) whose destructive power is enormous, this is the story of high inequality in the country due to bad leadership, high unemployment levels, slow implementation of the constitution and the global financial crisis. Young people are the most disenfranchised lot and as a result, form a revolutionary front, strongest in Coast and North Eastern Provinces to fight for secession. By 2031, a state of emergency is declared.

2011-2016	2017-2021	2022-2026	2027-2031
Politics	Politics	Politics	Politics
2012 elections peaceful	2021 elections; youth elected not tokenistic appointments to positions of influence	2022 elections; "youth" party wins presidency and control of parliament	2027 elections: Youth party loses power
New government structure	Constitution held ransom by political interests	President from marginalized community	Weak national government; strong counties
Counties under-prepared for devolution	Resort to youth mass action	Fight-back against historically entrenched political beneficiaries	Regional rebellion and revolution
Investment in entrenching constitutionalism	Formation of "youth" political party	"Youth party" ultimately collapses	Two regions demanding secession after referendum postponed - unrest
Frustration with slow space of constitutional implementation	EAC to remain an economic union, not political federation	Rise of regional groupings and ethicized networks	
		Referendum giving selected counties right to secede and join Somalia	
		Unrest in Coastal region as county demands for referendum on right to secede denied	
Economically	Economically	Economically	Economically
Global financial crisis affects economy	Privatization of state institutions	EAC to be retained purely as an economic union	In struggling counties, crime abounds
Preferential management of economy favours status quo	Repercussions following late procrastination of constitutional and legal requirements	Corruption increases	In counties doing well, protectionist policies guarding against "encroachment"
Resource conflicts	Unemployment and crime rates grow – ICT fraud	Economy falls into the hands of private sector "dream team" supported by BW institutions	Technology the driver
Rural – urban migration	Informal sector receives substantial support	Growing unemployment and higher basic living costs	Resource conflicts
ICT related commerce		Money moves from central to county governments	Rural – urban migration
Socially	Socially	Socially	Socially
Pressure to reform social institutions	State procrastination on constitutional implementation	Youth fall victim to poor lifestyle health issues	Health issues emanating from environmental degradation
Pressure on urban spaces	Perceived abandonment of state policies and responsibilities	Drug problem grows	HIV/AIDS declared a national disaster again
Pressure on social facilities and services	Marginalization of those who cannot afford to pay rates at private health and education institutions	Rationalization of state services and facilities	Development partners move focus of aid from governance related issues to health
Growing tolerance of liberal values	Inequality deepens – affecting marginalized communities most		Drought leads to high food costs and famine
Beginnings of "generational change" youth movement	Social conservatism under siege		

What the Newspapers might say



- **2019** - Kenya influences the rejection of the EAC political federation
- **2020** - Massive layoffs as state corporations are privatized
- **2021** - The African Spring! Mass protests by Kenya's youth over employment
- **2022** - Haki Yetu youth has a land slide win in elections
- **2022** - North Eastern gives Kenya youngest President - 35 year Old Abdi
- **2023** - 40% gender parity achieved under new party
 - Old Guard and big business sabotage efforts of inexperienced government
- **2024** - County governments cause intense national division
- **2025** - Peace in Somalia.
 - NE demanding for referendum to determine secession
 - Coast denied their long plea for secession
 - Youth militias controlling opposition politics and criminal activities
- **2027** - Haki Yetu toppled by old guard in elections
- **2029** - State of emergency declared on Kenya



2011 - 2016

The governments elected in 2012 seem unable to make much headway in engaging the key reforms necessary to bring about the desired national transformation. There is growing slow pace of constitutional reform in redressing inequalities all over the nation. Although devolution is set into motion after the elections, most counties are under-prepared for the transition and there is a lot of confusion at this level in these foundational years. There is also very slow progress with re-structuring state institutions, which face strong resistance from entrenched interests, particularly when it comes to affirmative action to the benefit of marginalized communities and sectors of the population, particularly the youth. The euphoria that greeted the promulgation of the 2010 constitution and the anticipation following the successful resolution of the 2012 elections ushering in a new government gives way to disillusionment and cynicism with existing structures.

The country's economy struggles under the global financial crisis, the gravity of the economic pressure particularly on marginalized communities hits the youth amongst them the hardest. Those charged with the management

of the economy respond with measures protecting the status quo. Youth begin to question the economic status quo that benefits only a handful at the expense of many, and demand a reform of the economic policy that takes into account the prevailing national environment with investment moving from the centre to the regions through the county system, and a diversification of the economy. The heart of their demands is for a judicious and transparent channeling of resources towards neglected and emerging sectors, particularly those accessible to the youth.

There is growing disillusionment with the traditional social institutions – particularly religious and the family – which are perceived as largely inadequate or unwilling to engage with the challenge of particular issues of pressing interest to the youth. A questioning of accepted values and norms open the doors to growing experimentation and embrace of new and alternative life choices and lifestyles within an environment increasingly influenced by global norms and discourses. Constitutional provisions supporting tolerance and diversity on a wide number of platforms encourage a re-examination of key pillars of Kenyan society. Youth in general are at the forefront of social activism.

All this builds into a growing youth movement, no longer content to take the back seat supporting those in positions of influence and power, but determined to take more responsibility for reforming the nation. Since youth programmes and projects do not seem to have much impact on the nation, their influence confined to uplifting only targeted communities and individuals, there is a growing impetus to youth “taking power” in the three realm of opportunity, manifest in a wide-spread generational change movement.

2017-2021

The successful 2017 national poll sees more youth elected into both national and county governments, in most cases at junior levels. The resulting excitement on the part of the youth is however gradually replaced by frustration at that constituency’s inability to influence real change. The pace of constitutional reform slows to crawl, with the political class uniting behind the “watermelon brigade” whose strategy is to either water down progressive revolutionary reforms into fairly harmless easily flouted changes, or hold up their effective implementation through existing legal

mechanisms. Realization slowly dawns that the political leadership across the board is only interested in using youth to boost their “generational change” credentials, with very few actually being granted access to decision-making spaces.

Arguing that Kenya is not ready for political federation, the government begins to lobby within the region for the EAC to remain purely an economic union.

The centerpiece of the new government’s economic reforms is a policy of privatization of national institutions and state resources, which it argues will benefit all citizens with the provision of better facilities and services, while providing the state with much-needed resources to ease the pressure of the global economic crisis. Unemployment sky rockets as the economy stagnates; things are not helped by dwindling funds from traditional development partners. The formal sector (civil service, civil society and private corporations) is forced into rationalization, including massive layoffs. The informal sector struggles under inadequate state support, with many of the fledgling start-ups succumbing to the harsh economic environment. Economic inequality deepens, exacerbated by state procrastination over the implementation of relevant constitutional and legislative provisions such as the Land policy.

Despite its promises, the state does not prioritize further implementation of the 2010 constitution, arguing in particular that the country cannot afford the realization of its responsibilities within the social realm under the Bill of Rights. As privatization becomes policy and practice, public social institutions deteriorate in number and quality, further marginalizing the growing number of Kenyans living under the poverty line. The crime rate rockets, with ICT based fraud rivaling violent offences with regard to youth participation. Socially conservative institutions becoming increasingly irrelevant, as the youth, now comprising the majority in the country, opt increasingly for legislation, policies and institutions embracing liberal values.

Kenya enters into another era of street mass action reminiscent of the nineties, and inspired by popular uprisings elsewhere in the world, and particularly within the continent of Africa. The state responds with brutal force. The inability to influence change from within the existing party structures inspires a mass exodus by the youth of all political persuasions into a new

donor-funded “youth” party, the Haki Yetu⁴⁸ party. In the run-up to the 2022 elections, Haki Yetu embarks on an aggressive well-resourced, innovative campaign, depending on ICT-supported social networks, high-energy performance events and grassroots chapters all over the country. It also draws significant support from the Kenyan Diaspora. Its platform prioritizes the implementation of the 2010 constitution in both spirit and letter, with particular reference to unfulfilled promises with regard to affirmative action for historically marginalized communities, particularly women and youth. The economic pillar promises a revolution of the economy, with three priorities: The enactment and implementation of policy benefiting marginal communities such as the rural pastoralists and urban youth from the lowest income brackets; the implementation of a transformational land policy; and an aggressive doubling of employment figures. Haki Yetu also advocates an emphasis on the state’s obligations with regard to the implementation of the Bill of Rights.

2022 - 2026 snapshot

In 2022 general election, Haki Yetu sweeps the board, winning control of senate and legislature at the national level as well as in the majority of the counties. The average age of county governors and the national senate drops to 30 years. The country also sees significant gains with regard to the presence of women in governance positions, with gender parity being achieved in just over 40% of the county governments, and well above the constitutional threshold of 30% elsewhere in the country. The president, himself a member of historically marginal religious and ethnic communities from the traditionally state-neglected North Eastern Province, becomes the face of the new government: young – he himself is 35 years old; energetic, and unencumbered with traditional to ethnic or economic strongholds.

A national referendum on the maturation of the EAC into a political federation held at the same time as the elections returns a resounding “No” with most of the voters preferring to retain the community as purely an economic union. On the national front, as the new national government sets to fulfilling its election promises, it finds itself facing a well-coordinated fight-back from the old political establishment supported by those of its traditional allies in big business who are deeply concerned at the projected revolution of the status quo. Sabotage of the economy follows, disrupting the government’s planned

48 A Kiswahili phrase literary translated to mean ‘our rights’.

social transformation; every attempt to roll back previous privatization of state resources stalls as it is dragged through the courts. Corruption flourishes as the military and civil service is roped into the systematic programme of insidious undermining of the largely inexperienced national government. The government finally is forced to give in to the demands of the influential corporate sector, including the appointment of a “financial dream team” handpicked by a cabal of business leaders, and supported by Breton Woods institutions. This team reasserts the interest of the traditional “big players”; while relevant parts of the economy respond favourably, the cost of living escalates. Growing unemployment further worsens the plight of the middle- and lower income classes, particularly those living in major urban centers such as Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu. Further rationalization of public social services follows; the provision of public health and education services in particular is now largely in the hands of non-governmental charitable organizations. These are unable however to cope with the growing demand – forcing the majority of the most vulnerable to do without. In large tracts of Kenya, the social disease that had preceded the 2022 elections returns. Social institutions struggle to cope: the traditional family in particular, is under siege, crumbling under the onslaught of economic pressure, as well as a collapse of conservative values. There is a growing national health crisis resulting from widespread drug abuse, risky sexual behaviour and the consequences of environmental degradation – and poorly trained medical personnel graduating from state institutions where educational standards have plummeted as resources dwindle.

In a number of counties however, the new governments are able to overcome opposition to policies designed to maximize the potential of regional resources, with results rapidly becoming manifest as these counties beat the odds to flourish in stark opposition to their neighbours. The most successful counties are even able to supplant the national government in terms of taking on responsibilities that it is unable to fulfill. Those counties whose leaders have attracted a significant critical mass resolved to follow-through with a carefully structured programme of change responding to the priorities set forth by the Haki Yetu platform, regardless of whether they are youth themselves or not, are able to forge through the political and economic difficulties of transformation. In contrast, the others are crippled by factional wars, particularly of a generational nature. Intra-country migration patterns begin to change, as Kenyans of all backgrounds begin to flock towards these thriving regions, abandoning counties where political infighting has stymied the social and economic progress envisioned

in 2022. Investment flourishes in these counties; as the standard of living rises significantly within them in comparison to other counties, they develop innovative financial systems enabling them to bypass national institutions and frameworks, and their social infrastructure benefits as these counties are able to attract – and support appropriately – the best the labour market has to offer. Kenya’s membership of the East African Community is particularly useful in this regard. Social and economic inequality in Kenya re-aligns itself, this time largely on boundary lines demarcating county borders.

Following the successful re-entry of Somalia into the global family of nations in 2023, several counties in what was once the North Eastern province of the country demand a repeat of the independence era referendum. The stated goal is to become a part of a unified Somalia. Designed on the Sudan model, a five year grace period from 2026 is set to allow for extensive civic education and political consultations on the matter. A similar call for a referendum from another set of counties, this time from the Coastal region, is denied. A youth militia group from that region immediately declares war on the country, vowing to fight for the independence of the region.

The president finds himself concentrating his energies on fighting an aggressive political campaign, attacked on every front. The party is accused of pandering to its “foreign masters and funders”; insidious allegations questioning his identity as a Kenyan and loyalty to the country proliferate. The government loses its popularity with each passing year; by 2026, Haki Yetu is largely divided, its members largely disillusioned and frustrated by its inability to deliver on its rosy election promises. Identity discourses that had disappeared during the foundational years of the party’s existence – particularly focusing negatively on ancestry and religion – resurface with a vengeance, further weakening the party. The diaspora’s support is diverted from the national government to particular counties, particularly those that are doing well. Kenya goes into the next election season as a deeply divided country.

2027 - 2031

In the 2027 polls, Haki Yetu loses the presidential election as well as control of the national government to a loose alliance of parties. The resulting government is weak; the new president – whose political career stretches back forty years – is elected on the promise to restore the country to the

glories it allegedly squandered away in electing inexperience five years earlier. Forced to make political concession after concession to keep the ruling coalition from collapse, he moves fast to roll back the gains made by historically marginalized communities under the Haki Yetu era. Youth and other marginalized communities who had dominated the previous government are accused of mismanaging the country; a quiet policy of discrimination against them, reverses the gains made by the affirmative action policies of the Haki Yetu government.

The political centre of the nation shifts to the county governments, which are dominated by those that have managed to build strong, well-resourced, well-managed entities. Foreign investment – both from the Diaspora and elsewhere – flows to these counties. The average age of county leaders is ten years younger than those at the national level; significantly, the most successful counties tend to also be those whose political and administrative leadership is drawn from those under fifty years of age, in many cases under the mentorship of older citizens. The county governments effectively work together in the senate, manipulating a divided parliament into pressurizing the state into granting them more autonomy and resources. While some county governments continue to flourish, others fall prey to poor governance; corruption and the mismanagement of resources here exacerbate the already glaring regional inequalities. Those counties that are doing well become increasingly territorial, introducing protectionist policies to guard their economies and social institutions against what they see as national encroachment. Identity discourses dominate political rallies, with politicians from flourishing countries threatening “aliens” who have come, they claim, to reap what they did not sow. Internal divisions deepen as some counties introduce internal identity documents; as the next elections approach, there is massive internal migration as non-indigenes choose to move rather than risk becoming victims of election-related violence.


Crime rates all over the country increase, with kidnappings and violent robberies targeting those seen as well-off. A series of scattered bombings and grenade attacks against key national institutions and economic strongholds in well-performing counties is blamed on disaffected youth from poorly performing countries, even though the national police force is unable to arrest anyone. There are also allegations that this is the work of the rebel youth militia from those counties denied the right of secession.


The state seems unable to fulfill its basic responsibilities, government policies are flouted with impunity leading to severe environmental degradation of important natural resources such as forests, lakes and rivers. As several

counties are unable to provide adequate health services to meet the needs of their constituencies, health becomes a major national crisis. The country becomes the poster-child for global campaigns on the management and eradication of communicable diseases, with donors prioritizing this sector at the expense of all others. Counties relying on agriculture as the mainstay of their earnings struggle to maintain their historical dominance of the national economy – even traditional leaders such as coffee and tea, as the consequences of many years of environmental abuse take their toll. A severe drought in 2028 plunges the country into famine – food prices escalate.

In early 2029, the national referendum that was to be held in August on the question of secession in the northern region of the country once known is postponed, with the government citing the famine and security concerns. A State of Emergency is declared as youth militia in twelve counties across the Kenyan coast and northern regions unite to form a revolutionary front demanding secession. The government is forced to send the Kenya Defense Forces into the region; and leave is cancelled for all members of the National Police Services all over the country as acts of apparent random terrorism multiply.

By 2031, Kenya is a deeply divided country, with county boundaries functioning as effectively as the national borders separating the country from its EAC neighbours. Although the national per capita income suggests that the country has not fared as badly economically as many of its neighbours, the economic and social inequalities in the country have forced most of the population into calling one of two extremes “home”: luxury mansions surrounded by eight-foot high electrified fences or dilapidated shacks. For some, the future has never looked brighter; for millions others, it has never been so bleak






Scenario Story 2:

Like an ocean which has a continuous body of water with relatively free interchange among its parts that occupies 70% of the earth's surface, the ocean scenario is a story of a leadership that adequately invests in the bulging youth population through social programmes. The country taps into the opportunity that this demographic structure provides and is able to avert a crisis. By 2031, the leadership begins to prepare the country for a transition to a mature population structure, determined to reap the best this opportunity has to offer.




2011-2016	2017-2021	2022-2026	2027-2031
Politics	Politics	Politics	Politics
2012 elections: high youth voter turnout; high number of youth elected as MPs, ward representatives	2017 elections: election of 48 year old female president on youth and development platform	2022 elections: President elected with smaller majority	2027 elections: New male president elected - moderate
Initial confusion about devolution leads to intensive civic education; later on system ironed out	Development of several policies addressing priority areas; later on implementation of policies begins	Opposition coalition formed on social and fiscal conservative platform	2029 – President resigns following pressure after being implicated in corruption scandal. Replaced by Deputy President
Gradually constitutional implementation on track	Somalia peace treaty signed	Peace returns to Somalia	Kenya begins to push for EAC to become political federation
	EAC political federation denied		State begins to prioritise Senior Citizen policy
Economically	Economically	Economically	Economically
High cost of living	County governments – drivers of the economy; affirmative action for historically marginalized counties and rural regions	Slow economic growth as state spends on social welfare programmes	Intra-county competition healthy reinforcing strong national identity
High unemployment	ICT driver in many new areas including agriculture – attracting youth back to land	Unemployment rates begin to turnaround	Diversity based on regional strengths helps mitigate effects of 2028 drought. Situation managed
	New financing partnerships developed	Leadership of economy diversified	Unemployment rates lowest in Africa thanks to thriving informal sector driven by youth
	Rural – urban migration patterns reversal begins		Kenya becomes global ICT centre; centerpiece of economy
Socially	Socially	Socially	Socially
Priority health concerns: mental drug abuse as well as reproductive health related	Youth bulge becoming more marked; government invests in youth; new policy restricting number of children per family to 3	Benefits of youth bulge begin to become apparent	Youth bulge celebrated as Kenya's greatest resource
Youth bulge concern	Gender gains.	Debate on national culture, identity and values	Health priorities become lifestyle diseases replacing HIV/AIDS, malaria
Shift from quantity to quality in education	More permissive society; religious conservatives and liberals become more divided	Education – emphasis on ICT begins to pay off as population ICT savvy	Education curriculum re-structured
Growing ICT emphasis in all fields	Traditional family changing rapidly		

What the Newspapers might say



- **2011-2016** – judiciary competently resolves devolution quagmire
 - Kenya's devolution structure praise globally
 - Prioritization and investment in social sector and informal sectors
- **2017** - History made as Kenya elects first female and youngest president
- **2019** - EAC as a political federation rejected but by
- **2020** - Somali peace talks
 - Government invading our bedrooms. A 3 children policy?
 - Sizeable support by youth to legalize same sex marriages
- **2022** - Madam President regains her sit
- **2025** - Somalia applies to be join the EAC
 - Secession a non-issue
- **2026** - Legalization of same sex marriage
 - Drought anticipated in 2028 and preparations are underway
- **2031** - EAC as a political federation
 - Senior citizens policy launched



2011 - 2016

The transition into a new constitutional dispensation adds excitement to the 2012 general election as a record number of youth offer themselves up for electoral posts. In the county governments, 50% of those elected fall between the ages of 25 and 50 years of age. The majority of these are ward representatives; although only 15 of the 47 counties have a county executive committee whose members have an average age of less than 45 years. In the national parliament, the age division is clear; the National Assembly has an average age fifteen years younger than the Senate.

2013 is dominated by conflict between the national and county governments as the nation struggles to adjust to the new structure. Acrimonious debate, with counter-accusations of each usurping the other's roles and responsibilities, push this issue to the top of the constitutional implementation programme, with the reformed Judiciary emerging the surprise national heroes in demonstrating independence, integrity and fairness in related judgements. An aggressive civic education campaign on devolution enlists citizen participation in the process of government.

With time, Kenya's transition into devolution is beginning to draw attention as a potential model for emulation. County governments have developed framework and institutions to deliver services with a healthy spirit of competition. Counties that have historically been regarded as economic deadweight are leading the way in the evolution of innovative processes and products responding to unique characteristics that have sidelined them in the past. In several of the counties making up what were formerly the Coast and North Eastern provinces, there is extensive debate throughout this period on the right of secession; this discourse seems particularly popular with the youth. A bill introduced in the Senate in 2015 seeking a constitutional amendment to give counties the powers to secede is defeated.

With the cost of living continuing to sky-rocket in response to the global financial crisis, Kenyans continue to face hard times. Massive industrial layoffs only exacerbate the dire unemployment picture. The new government releases a new economic policy prioritizing the incorporation of ICT in all sectors of the economy and an aggressive diversification programme geared at cushioning the country from the vagaries of international trends and unpredictable weather patterns. The informal sector is also the focus of a massive investment strategy, with most of the resources being sourced from the Kenyan Diaspora.

Two other areas of emphasis in this period are education and health. A revamp of the education system with civic education and ICT being introduced at all levels is accompanied by a re-examination of health priorities. In particular, reproductive health, mental health and drug abuse-related concerns become new priorities related to the growing youth bulge. In 2015, following recommendations emanating out of the annual national youth conference, a public-private-civil society partnership begins a multi-year comprehensive engagement with members of youth militia all over the country with the goal of providing legitimate solutions for identified priorities.

2017 - 2021

The big news of the 2017 elections: the election of a 48 year old female president on a youth and development platform. The new president draws her support from around the nation and across party lines,

surprising opponents whose campaigns have been built very much on traditional ethnic-based politics. The president declares as the focus of her government the strengthening of the national government's role on policy issues, particularly with regard to implementation and monitoring and the strengthening of related institutions. The first two years of her tenure sees the national government carry out an extensive and exhaustive review and harmonisation of all national policies – food security, education, agriculture, environment, economy, health, culture, trade, international relations, communication etc. The integration of appropriate technology (including ICT) and the mentoring of the next generation of leadership in each of these areas become the twin priorities of the national agenda. After peaking in 2018, national polls tracing support for a constitutional amendment giving counties the right to secede gradually diminish as they become the focus of a national economic diversification programme following a series of national conversations on the new economic policy. This policy leads to some hard choices especially it argues for affirmative action for historically marginalized areas of the country as well as emerging or neglected sectors of the economy. The rural-urban migration pattern begins to reverse as science and business parks, creative industry hubs, ICT villages and other such centers are set up in different parts of the country as appropriate infrastructure is rolled out to meet these needs. The Kenyan Diaspora becomes the government's biggest development partner, and the loudest champion of county-focused economic development. Meanwhile, Kenya turns east with regard to its trade, embracing its strategic place in the Indian Ocean region as the global financial centre shifts from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean.

In 2019, in partnership with the revived NGO council, the government launches a comprehensive grassroots civic agency programme which harnesses the citizen participation in the evaluation and monitoring of government responsibilities on the grassroots level. The family comes under focus in the public sphere, following publication of the 2019 census results showing a rise in single parent households, and the 2020 Supreme Court's finding of polyandry as constitutional.

On behalf of the AU, Kenya hosts a series of "Somalia peace talks", which culminate in the signing of a treaty in 2020. Meanwhile, a regional referendum in 2019 sees the proposal for the political federation of the East African Community's (EAC) seven member states is defeated.

While the youth bulge is becoming more marked, the government's overt focus on demographical priorities is beginning to pay off. Some policies are unpopular, like the state's decision to restrict free access to public services to three children per family, but this is balanced by other benefits. An upgrade of public health and education facilities all over the country, with rural counties prioritized in the development of new facilities comes at heavy cost to the national economy, but it receives significant public support. So too does the revamp of the national curricula, now tailored to reflect the needs of different regions in the nation. Society seems to become more permissive, with growing support for the legalization of same-sex marriage, which brings into focus the growing divide between conservative and liberal elements in Kenya.

2022 - 2026

The incumbent is re-elected for a second term, albeit with a smaller majority. With an average age of 50 years, the new National Executive is the youngest team ever to be entrusted with the leadership of the country; a significant number of its members, including the Deputy have participated in the president's youth development programme. This time around, the formerly fractured opposition has united under the umbrella of social conservatism. Also in focus is what the opposition argues to be the prohibitive cost of the government policies, which are labeled as populist, economically unsustainable, and discriminatory against those parts of the country not benefiting from the affirmative action programmes. After its narrow loss in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the opposition, which draws large support from some parts of the country, continues to show its strength in the national parliament, making the Senate and the National Assembly vibrant platforms spurring vibrant debate in the public sphere on a range of issues. The president and her team are kept on their toes, arguing the benefits of their policies, buoyed by statistics affirming the slow, but sure economic growth and the largely positive effect of the wide-reaching public welfare programmes.

A stable, peaceful Somalia applies to join the East African Community in 2025. Piracy has diminished to a negligible trickle, and the Eastern African seaboard is now one of the most attractive regions for global investment, offering everything from tourism to low-cost transportation. Unemployment figures, while still high, have finally begun a downward

turn. More importantly, with the rise of previously invisible sectors of the economy as the new GDP earners, the leadership of the Kenyan economy, that had once seemed a male gerontocracy, is now significantly a reflection of the national population.

In 2026, a constitutional amendment by popular initiative proposes the legalization of same-sex marriage. It narrowly passes in both houses of parliament, after a robust national debate echoed all over the country on Kenyan culture, values and identity. The role of religion in national life in relation to the constitution comes under particular scrutiny.

2027 - 2031

The 2027 elections are an exciting contest between three new candidates, as the incumbent retires after the completion of her second term. Under the new president, a moderate backed by the coalition of conservative parties, the country begins its journey towards more liberal policies, improving its relationship with the Breton Woods institutions. Many of the affirmative action programmes are either wound up within this period or downsized, with the government arguing that they have accomplished their goal. While there is still some catching up to do, most Kenyans have accepted in principle that intra-county competition for resources is less beneficial to the nation than an integrated system redressing the imbalances in the country. The question of maintaining the delicate balance becomes the focus of civic action for the next five years.

In 2027, the country begins to put in place alleviatory measures to counter the effects of a drought expected to peak in 2028. Kenya is, for the first time in its history, able to not only feed its entire population with no problem during this period, but also continue to export food.

In 2028, the former president becomes the youngest recipient ever of the Mo Ibrahim prize for good governance. She is later appointed to a panel of eminent persons leading a new initiative to translate the EAC into a political federation.

In 2029, following intense pressure from his party as well as country-wide demonstrations, the president resigns after being implicated in a corruption scam. He is succeeded by the Deputy President.

As the country approaches the 2032 elections, the youth bulge is celebrated as Kenya's biggest resource and key to success; however attention begins to shift towards preparing its transition into its mature years. In 2030, the circulation of a Senior Citizens draft policy launches a national conversation on this issue. Shifting priorities in health as lifestyle diseases become the leading cost to national health budget. With regard to education, the focus turns to diversifying post-graduate opportunities, with the goal of enhancing the number of Kenyans returning to school in their mature years.





Scenario Story 3:

Like a pond (which is a body of stagnant water ideal for infestation and not ideal for providing drinking water), the pond scenario is the story of inertia by most youth except those leading the secessionist movement. Bad governance, human rights abuses, impunity etc breed an ungovernable country that eventually fails

2011-2016	2017-2021	2022-2026	2027-2031
Politics	Politics	Politics	Politics
2012 elections: Youth struggle to win influential positions in government and settle for junior elective posts	2017 elections: pre-election violence climaxes in assassination of leading opposition candidate; demonstrations quelled by force; commission of inquiry set up; incumbent wins	2022 elections: youth boycott; incumbent picks winning candidate	2027: retired military general becomes president amidst growing insecurity
Infighting between national and county governments	Constitution under siege	Judiciary compromised	
Corruption devolved to county level; tribal fiefdoms develop	Politics heavily ethicized	Constitution discredited	
Diminishing investment in constitution; implementation sabotaged	Unequal development increases inequality in nation	Secessionist movement declares independence	Several counties secede
Political assassinations era begins in run-up to 2017 elections	Secession becomes rallying cry in some counties	EAC collapses	Kenya at war
Economically	Economically	Economically	Economically
Affected by global financial crisis; Traditional mainstays hard-hit	Kenya turns East as Western traditional development partners back off	Food security an issue despite food export zone booming	2028 drought lead to Kenya's worst famine in nation's independence history; even as food export zones continue to do well
Youth unemployment figures continue to worsen	Growing inequalities; handful of counties and sectors experience boom; others collapse	Kenya becoming increasingly unattractive as business environment	Investors continue to leave Kenya
Foreign investment diminish	Food export zones and ICT biggest foreign exchange earners	Economic exclusion of youth, particularly of urban poor	Kenya facing increased competition for resources from EAC partners
	Youth frustration as informal sector stumbles	Unemployment figures remain high	
	Rural urban migration		
Socially	Socially	Socially	Socially
Youth bulge seen as a burden	Growing problem with youth militia; domestic terrorism	Health becomes the national priority in area of social services	Increase in number and influence of youth vigilante groups
Growing youth frustration as government, economic and social leadership close ranks to lock out youth	Pressure on traditional social institutions with growing liberal values	Pressure on traditional family as 2 parent family becomes a minority	
Quality of public social services diminish; private facilities expensive	Growing gaps between classes and counties	Economic and political exiles	
Crime surge: cyber fraud; robbery with violence; youth vigilante; illegal drugs	Massive brain drain	Religious platform for change launched	
	Rising insecurity	Crime figures rise; worsened by growing drug and gang culture	

What the Newspapers might say



- **2011-2016** – judiciary in bed with the executive
 - Counties are tribal fiefdoms
 - Crime squad turns to a death squad
- **2017** – Opposition leader assassinated as retaliatory attacks by youth gangs escalate
 - Incumbent wins election causing uproar
- **2017-2021** – Western donors withdraw support & Kenya turns East
 - Food export zones on Kenya's prime land cause uproar as food insecurity escalates
- **2018** – EAC report highlights Kenya's massive human rights abuses
 - EAC report ranks Kenya Africa's drug hub
- **2019** – UNEP and other international companies move to Arusha
 - Kenya given the 'terrorist red alert' status
- **2024** – legalized gay marriages
- **2026** – gay couples allowed to adopt children
- **2027** – secessionist groups use armed persuasion
- **2028** – worst famine
- **2030** – 10 counties declare themselves a sovereign state
- **2031** – Kenya becomes ungovernable. We are a failed state.



2011-2016

High expectations accompany the transition into a devolved system of government. A record number of youth offer themselves for election at different levels of government in 2012, the majority of them for the first time. Not many can match the financial muscle of their opponent; fewer still have amassed the political capital within their parties to level the playing ground in securing nomination to stand for the senior positions such as that of Governor. While a good number of youth do get elected, especially to the county governments, most become ward representatives with very real little influence beyond their immediate constituency. The handful who do become members of the national parliament are held hostage to a system of political patronage that weakens their independence and ability to drive any real change at that level.

The next five years are characterized by in-fighting between the national and county governments. There is confusion regarding the separation of

powers and assignment of responsibilities and roles, with the national government fighting to retain control of the counties. The Executive is accused, for example, of compromising the independence of the Controller of Budget, complicating the release of funds from the national treasury to the counties. The latter respond by pushing for complete autonomy, resisting any attempt by the national government to interfere in their "internal affairs". The biggest victims of this fight are the public social services and facilities that are ostensibly under the management of the county governments but reliant on resources from the national treasury. The Judiciary, deluged by a flood of constitutional cases and crippled by financial restraints, is unable to move rapidly in resolving the numerous court cases on the mechanics of devolution. Politicians take advantage of the grey spaces created in the existing legislation to transform counties into tribal fiefdoms. Corruption devolves to the county level. Citing financial inability, the state drags its feet on the resourcing of the new constitutional institutions. Kenyans grow increasingly disillusioned with the 2010 constitution; cynicism greets every initiative to translate new provisions from paper to reality as more and more of the newly created commissions and offices stall in fulfilling their mandate.

The national economy is struggling in the context created by the global financial crisis. Foreign investment diminishes, the national debt grows. The traditional mainstays – agriculture and tourism – have been particularly hard-hit at a time when fuel costs keep rising. The value of the Kenyan shilling plummets. The informal sector, which has become the biggest employer of youth all over the country, is another big victim of the instable financial environment. On the other hand, Kenya becomes a continental ICT hub; those in the industry do exceptionally well.

As cost of living and unemployment rates rise steadily, there is a corresponding upsurge in crime. The government launches special crime investigation squads in response, dealing with four focus areas: cyber fraud, youth vigilante groups, illegal drugs and robbery with violence. Initial public support for these police initiatives drops dramatically, after a series of investigative stories in the media accuse some of these units of being (political) death squads.

Meanwhile, public health and education facilities stagger under the growing demand; some counties close down some of the hospitals and schools

in order to consolidate the minimal resources that they do have. Private institutions mushroom in number, but their services are unaffordable for the majority.

2017-2021

2017 begins inauspiciously; the country is thrown into disarray after the leading political opposition candidate is assassinated. Ensuing demonstrations in some parts of the country are only quelled by brute military force. This is the climax of a pre-election season that is marred by political violence, characterized by physical fights between rival youth gangs associated with particular candidates as well as targeted violence against individual candidates and their families. Avowing its innocence, the government declares three days of national motivation while inviting the EAC to conduct a Commission of Inquiry into the assassination. Despite outcry from the opposition, the international community rallies behind the government's action, fearing a repeat of the post-2007 election violence. By June 2017, an uneasy peace has prevailed. However, many people choose to stay away from the election campaigns and polls, fearing to be caught up in violence. The narrow win at the presidential and parliamentary polls by the incumbent president and ruling coalition of parties deepens the division in the country, particularly on ethnic and regional lines. At his inaugural speech, the president promises to reward "those who demonstrated their faith in my administration", while urging those in opposition strongholds to "wake up and smell the coffee" if they wanted to enjoy government.

The constitution falls under renewed scrutiny after the Judiciary throws out a highly publicized test case on discrimination on technicalities. Impunity follows, as tribalism within the county government structures takes hold, with non-indigenes being denied opportunities and, in the most extreme cases, services, on the grounds of their ancestral origin. On the national front, accusations of partisanship in the allocation of resources from the national coffers to the benefit of pro-government regions are summarily dismissed by state officials, but become the fuel for dissatisfaction in those opposition-friendly areas. At both county and national government level, exacerbated levels of inequality are blamed on a skewed allocation of resources. While a handful of counties experience growth in their economies, with resultant consequences on critical social service areas such as health, housing and education, things get steadily worse for the majority.

With many of the traditional development partners withholding aid citing governance concerns, Kenya turns East in search of alternative investment. Controversial in this regard is a new land policy encouraging the lease of prime agricultural land to grow food exclusively for export back to the investing countries. Those counties able to enter into rewarding agreements with foreign governments on this secure lucrative contracts that see them export huge harvests, cultivated with technological expertise from the recipient nations, even as food security becomes more and more of a critical issue for other Kenyans. With tourism figures dropping, the food export zones and the IT industry shoot to the top of the list of foreign exchange earners.

Insecurity becomes a national crisis, with the release of the inconclusive results of the EAC commission report in 2018 that details the alarming state of affairs with regard to political violence and assassination in Kenya. This report coincides with another identifying Kenya as the drug hub of Africa, blaming political interference for the police force's inability to check the drug trade. In 2019, the UN announces its plans to move its UNEP headquarters to Arusha, precipitating a general exit from Nairobi of many other international organizations. Apart from rising domestic crime, Kenya has become a new haven for international terrorism, with the Northern and Coastal regions of the country becoming implicated in global analyses of terrorism. Locally, however, there is talk that the spate of grenade and bomb attacks, kidnappings, and related activities are actually the work of the growing secessionist movement that has gone underground following government dismissal of its demands. The State suspends elements of the Bill of Rights on the grounds of security; political detentions become the order of the day.

The glaring inequality between counties becomes more and more marked as the years go by. The select number of those that are doing exceptionally well set up a C15 grouping, to protect their interests from the others. Initial intra-country migration in favour of these counties is reversed as they develop more and more of a protectionist attitude, with youth from non- or low-performing counties abandoning Kenya in search of greener pastures elsewhere. There is also the growth of a tiny wealthy "super-class" that has been able to profit from this environment, whose glittering lifestyle contrasts sharply with the majority of Kenyans, especially those located in the poorest performing counties. Urban youth from the lower income bracket in particular, fall victim to criminal activities and health

complications emanating from drug and alcohol abuse, now competing with STD as the leading cause of death among the 15 – 30 years age bracket. Social institutions – especially those that are familial and religious in nature – seem unable to cope. Religious leaders attempt to intervene as the voice of moral authority but their influence, severely weakened in the first twenty years of the millennium, is weak and ineffective.

2022 - 2026

In January 2022, an underground movement claiming to be the armed wing of the secessionist cause, drawing its support principally from the Northern and Coastal regions, declares these regions in the process of becoming independent from Kenya. It urges its supporters to boycott the national and county government polls, in preparation for independence. While many people in the region denounce the group's militancy, there is widespread support for its cause, with deep hostility evident in the region (and beyond) towards a state largely perceived as arrogant, partisan and blind to the needs of the majority. In August that year, as the preparation for the 2022 polls move into high gear, the secessionists publish their manifesto, which aims at independence for a new country, made up of 10 Kenyan counties, with possible additions from Somalia and Tanzania. Despite the national government's dismissal of this manifesto, which is declared a seditious publication, the 2022 polls produce the lowest voter turnout in the country's history in the identified regions.

Youth are significantly absent in the roll-call of winners at the polls, a further reflection of their apathy in the campaigns which seem to draw large crowds only when there is significant exchange of money. The new president, the son-in-law of the retiring incumbent, pledges to continue the policies of the previous administration. The government announces a new drive to jumpstart the economy, partnering with the private sector to provide incentives to attract investment to the country.

Youth frustration mounts in the face of steadily worsening economic outlook. By 2025, Kenya is consistently topping polls as the most corrupt country in the region, making it more and more difficult to do business in this country as compared to its EAC partners. More and more young people take advantage of labour regulations facilitating free movement within the community, and migrate to better-performing partner states in the region.

Drugs and gangs become the dominant features in youth related crime, particularly in urban centers.

A new report in 2026 puts the spotlight on the changing Kenyan family. The once-standard two-parent family is a recognizable a minority in many parts of the country, with many youth opting out of marriage altogether. The legalisation of homosexuality in 2024 through a Supreme Court amendment is extended to allow gay couples to legally able to adopt children in 2026. A coalition of religious institutions launch a platform for change. Many people flee the country and go into political exile.

2027 - 2031

The 2027 polls take place in an atmosphere of heightened tensions, with the secessionists making good their threat to resort to “armed persuasion”. The military moves into the affected region, which is now put under State of Emergency conditions. A poll marred by voter apathy, insecurity, political violence, a poorly coordinated opposition boycott and allegations of electoral fraud sees the election of a retired military colonel as president on a platform of restoring peace and stability to the country.


Drought strikes the country in 2028, and Kenya experiences it worst famine in recorded history. The UN leads the world in offering humanitarian help, but hundreds die. The government sends in the police, supported by the military, to protect the foreign-owned food export zones from invasion, after locals in some counties blame the irrigation systems they have set up of exacerbating an already bad situation. The economy continues to stagnate as more and more investors pull their money out of Kenya and move it elsewhere. Kenya, facing competition from other countries in the EAC which have also set up ICT hubs – many staffed by Kenyan citizens, begins to struggle to keep its dominance in this area. Youth vigilante groups increase in number and demands; in some counties, they not only outnumber the police force, but also seem more resourced and better trained. Some even take control of public facilities and levy a fee for their use; ironically, this sometimes results in the amelioration of services for the most vulnerable people.

On December 1st 2030, the nation is taken by surprise when ten “secessionist” Kenyan counties declare themselves a separate country. Attempts by the

religious coalition to broker peace are shrugged off by the state, which sees it as anti-government. The nation is deeply divided in its support for and against was as the best alternative to resolve the crisis. After giving the rebel counties three days to revoke their Declaration of Independence, the government declares a State of Emergency. Fighting begins in earnest, as the military moves in to defend the integrity of the nation. The EAC, AU, IGAD and UN all mount emergency peace missions.

2031 finds Kenya at war and in every way, a failed state.





Scenario Story 4:


After a long period of being fully formed, the water falling off the ledge in a waterfall retreats, causing a horizontal pit parallel to the waterfall wall. Eventually, as the pit grows deeper, the waterfall collapses to be replaced by a steeply sloping stretch of river bed. This is the case with the water fall scenario. After intense demands by young people for jobs to be created and the country's economy grows young people retreat from political participation and pursue economic success.

2011-2016	2017-2021	2022-2026	2027-2031
Politics	Politics	Politics	Politics
2012 elections: youth elected mainly to county governments; have little influence in three arms of national government	2017 elections dominated by money; youth candidates wiped out; continuity in government	2022 elections: youth apathy in response to marginalization in decision-making	2027 election: first female president elected; 75 year old
Transition into devolution proceeds well	Affirmative action sees results in areas of gender and disabilities but not with regard to youth	Few youth elected; growing cynicism in Kenya with youth leadership potential	Leadership crisis in Kenya as generational transition begins with search for new leadership in political, economic and social realms
2014 youth-led demonstrations against poor governance leads to state prioritizing youth issues	Government formulates strong policies	Youth interested in political careers leave Kenya for regional politics	Kenya begins preparation for 2032 referendum (select counties) for secession to Somalia
	Constitution and constitutional institutions (except for the Executive) lose importance in the public sphere	EAC begins transition to political federation	
	Kenya hosts UN Somalia conference; agrees to referendum		
Economically	Economically	Economically	Economically
High unemployment figures lead to demonstrations in 2014	Migration patterns change: urban to rural, brain drain to brain gain	GDP on a steady rise	Shilling comes under pressure as Somalia takes off, with investors turning north
Youth turn to counties to find employment, particularly getting involved in creating e-government systems	Government policies gradually begin to turn economy around	Food export zones introduced successfully with China as chief beneficiary	Kenya survives 2026 drought with help from development partners
Unemployment figures gradually begin to turnaround	Both formal and informal sectors flourish		Kenya facing increased competition for resources from EAC partners
Investment in informal sector, diversification and ICT.	Kenya's new membership turns BRICS bloc into BRICKS bloc		
Brain drain	ICT becomes hallmark of Kenyan economy – and crime		
Socially	Socially	Socially	Socially
High rural-urban migration lead to growth of slums	Liberal values flourish; youth become more focused on making money	Unhealthy generation – lifestyle diseases taking toll	State begins to plan for older populace as population bulge move out of youth bracket
Youth challenge status quo in social realm; dis-engage from traditional social institutions	“Average” family model undergoes substantive change	Transition to privatization of social services	Youth perception of marginalization leads to beginnings of new youth movement
Diaspora becomes involved in investing in Kenya with benefit to social services and welfare systems	China becomes the cultural centre for Kenya		
	Youth locked out of leadership opportunities		

What the Newspapers might say



- **2013** – Operation 'linda katiba' is vigilant about constitutional implementation
- **2014** – *Vijana tugutuke* movement (VTM) conducts mass sit-ins to advocate for jobs
- **2016** – Government negotiates with VTM and implements agreements
- **2017** – First blind county governor
- **2019** – EAC begins transition to political federation
- **2020** – UN oversees separation of Somali land, Puntland and Juba land
- **2024** – lowest youth voter town out in the history of Kenya
- **2028** – Peaceful Somali launches 'open for business' campaign attracting high foreign investments



2011 - 2016

The successful “Vijana tugutuke” caravan that saw a record number of youth register as voters in the 2007 elections makes a welcome return in the run-up to the 2012 general election, this time advocating for an increase in the number of youth elected to government at both national and county level. The campaign’s results this time around are mixed; on the county level, the majority of those elected as ward representatives are under the age of 40. Only a small handful of these are however actually incorporated into the county executive committees. Furthermore, the picture is reversed at the senior levels of the county governments. All the county governors and their deputies, as well as well over 90% of the Senate are over the age of 50 years, a situation reciprocated in all three arms of the national government. The new national government, elected on a platform of constitutional implementation, suffers some temporary setbacks when its initial attempts to usurp county government responsibilities and resources are challenged in court by a vibrant citizen “Linda katiba” coalition. Once the initial confusion regarding the critical relationship between the national and county governments is sorted out, the country settles down

to translating devolution from paper to reality. Although E-government is supposed to be the order of the day, many of the counties lack the basic infrastructure and resources to translate policy into action.

As county governments begin the long and arduous process of institutionalization, job-seeking youth flock to county headquarters ill-prepared to cope with the large population large influx of job-seekers. The “Vijana Tugutuke” campaign metamorphoses into a youth-centered mass movement demanding government response to the twin issues of escalating living costs and rising unemployment. By January 2014, the movement has begun “Occupy Government” sit-ins targeting all 47 county headquarters as well as the national capital. Wary of a possible “Arab Spring” uprising, the national government moves quickly to negotiate with the leaders of the movement, promising and putting into place comprehensive programmes addressing these concerns. The leaders of the movement are incorporated into government policy commissions.

By 2016, the government begins to implement a comprehensive affirmative action policy to meet the needs of the counties through a revamped “Kazi Kwa Vijana” programme. A new agreement with the World Bank provides resources supporting the setting up of E-government at county level. A series of bi-lateral agreements with a coalition of development partners finances a re-structuring of the agricultural sector, prioritizing food security. An innovative international “Invest in Kenya” campaign leverages the resources of the Kenyan diaspora. Critical to the latter is a social welfare component, subsidizing public health, education and housing, particularly alleviating a growing urban crisis.

Civil society suffers a crisis of identity when it loses a significant percentage of its constituency to government, even as many constitutional reform stalwarts retire. Allegations of corruption, lack of integrity and poor corporate governance are leveled at many CSOs, further undermining public confidence in this sector.

2017 - 2021

The run-up to the 2017 elections sees money take centre stage, with huge amounts being spent at every level. This locks out most of the would-be youth candidates who simply do not have the resources to mount credible

campaigns. The incumbents dominate the victory lists: led by the president, whose deputy previously served as a senior Cabinet Secretary, and most of the governors and Senators. No-one is surprised when the president retains the Cabinet from the previous administration.

With the election of the nation's first blind county governor there is indication that significant progress has been made with regard to changing attitudes towards people with disabilities. She joins a significant constituency of women in senior levels of government, with gender parity within government institutions appearing more achievable than ever before. On the other hand, the number of youth elected and appointed to senior levels of government seems to have drastically diminished, with the average age of those in Cabinet rising to 55 years of age. As the president argues, in light of the global financial instability, the nation needs to harness wise leadership matured by years of experience. The government formulates and begins the gradual implementation of a series of strong policies covering priority areas identified by World Bank consultants. Youth are encouraged to play their part in building the nation by providing the manpower needed to implement these policies; few get the chance to contribute in the decision-making that determines the direction the nation is following.

With the global economy in freefall, it is a struggle to stabilize the economy. The government reduces the minimum wage in order to reduce layoffs. While most people struggle with the high cost of living, they are grateful to keep their jobs. Kenya gradually becomes attractive to foreign investors as labour costs fall; the IT-savvy workforce quickly adapts to the needs of the global market. The state imposes high taxes on the population, using the proceeds – so certified by the Auditor General - to service the national debt and sustain public institutions, which are no longer supported by development partners.

The focus of the youth shifts from political participation to economic success. Cyber crime becomes the new challenge for law enforcement, with Kenya rivalling Nigeria on a global survey on cyber fraud. There is a slow growth of youth militia, targeting the tiny percentage of super-rich Kenyans; kidnappings, hijackings and violent robbery returns to the Kenyan landscape. Another significant area of challenge for the government: growing health costs stemming from unhealthy lifestyle choices, particularly related to drug abuse, risky sexual behaviour and poor nutritional habits.

In 2020, Kenya hosts a UN special meeting on Somalia, where all invested parties (including the governments of the breakaway Jubaland, Somaliland and Puntland) agree on a formula for the way forward. This includes a phased re-unification with a complicated federalist structure. As part of the agreement, Kenya agrees to a referendum in the Kenyan counties bordering Somalia, as the final phase of the re-unification, giving residents a chance to vote for or against joining that country.

During this period, the constitutional process recedes from the public sphere, accelerated by the diminishing influence of civil society and the growing confidence in government. The Executive gradually strengthens its powers; at the expense of a Judiciary headed a Chief Justice seen as largely supportive of the president, and a parliament that seems to have abdicated its responsibility to the populace.

2022-2026

The 2022 elections confirm a worrying trend; the percentage of youth voters is at an all time low since the introduction of multi-party elections. Most youth have become disengaged with politics, focusing instead on their own individual success. The handful of youth candidates offering themselves for elections are dismissed as shallow and incompetent, with voters showing a marked preference with those who have already made it in life. The new president, the hand-picked successor to the retiring incumbent, comes to politics from a glittering career as an economist. His running mate had served in the previous administration as a Cabinet Secretary. They promise to consolidate Kenya's position as the leading economy in the region. The president follows his predecessor's tradition in prioritizing experience and maturity in his appointments to Cabinet and virtually every other area. An attempt to revive the youth movements of the first decade of the millennium falls flat; the would-be-leaders are labeled jobless conmen out to make a quick buck.

The country's GDP is on a steady rise, as is, after several hard years, the per capita income. The government begins to reduce its support for public health and education, quietly putting in place a systematic programme of privatization. The government brokers a trade agreement with China, inviting interested counties to rent out up to a third of their arable land to

the Chinese government for the purposes of growing food for export. The scheme proves very successful.

In 2025, a second UN congregation on Somalia in Mogadishu measuring the progress so far, celebrates the successful cessation of conflict within the borders of the country. The second phase – negotiating the re-unification of the country through the democratic re-incorporation of its breakaway regions - commences.

In 2024, a basket-fund set up by a group of bi- and multi-lateral development partners to facilitate youth political participation is shut down after an investigative report airs on television, documenting how the project has turned into a gravy-train for professional workshop-attendees, with little impact on the ground. The resulting scandal further delegitimizes youth credibility in the political sphere. Those serious about building a political career turn their attention to the East African and African Union legislative assemblies, where they are taken much more seriously. In December 2026, the East African Community finally begins in earnest the transition into political federation, following the ratification of a simple constitution. Member states agree to a long-drawn out complicated process of transition, beginning with the introduction of a ceremonial regional government.

2027 - 2031


Kenya elects its first female president in 2027. The 75 year old has served in government for over twenty-five years, since her appointment as a Cabinet Secretary in 2012, winning her first election in 2017 as running mate to the president. She replaces the incumbent who opts not to serve a second term, citing health concerns. Indeed, as a majority of the Cabinet from his administration – a team whose members, with few exceptions have led the country for much of the last two decades – have joined him in retirement, the new president is faced with the challenge of putting together a completely new team to steer the government. The situation is similar for many of the county governments. Most of the members for these new teams are drawn from the leadership of the civil society and the private sector.

While the national economy is still stable, the value of the shilling drops as the new team takes office, with market analysts citing investor concerns at

the relatively unknown leadership of the economy. This comes at a time when the new Somali government launches what turns out to be a very successful "Open for Business!" with global investors scrambling to beat the returning Somali Diaspora in staking out their interests in a now stabilized country. Only one of the independent regions has opted to remain its own republic; attention now turns to the final phase - the referendums in the Kenyan counties. The government begins preparation for a January 2032 referendum on this issue.

The government announces as its new priority a focus on the growing Senior Citizen population, with public services and facilities being re-tailored to accommodate changing social welfare needs. While assuring citizens of its continued commitment to existing health and education programmes, the state however feels the need to re-think allocations to each sector, given the falling external investment and development aid on one hand and the growing number of citizens now entering the latter phases of life.

A combined public universities student conference in 2030 passes a resolution condemning the marginalization of Kenyan youth. Citing the government's new focus on "established generations" as a rallying concern, the students begin to discuss ways of making their presence, priorities and potential tangible in Kenya, under the slogan: "Leaders today, not tomorrow!" There are simultaneous demonstrations on the same all over the country, led by secondary school students. As the country prepares to go into for its next general election, youth all over the country begin to leverage social networks of all kind into facilitating the beginnings of a new youth movement.



Our stories



Tsunami scenario

Active Participation

Inequality



Ocean scenario

Active Participation

equality



Pond scenario

Passive Participation

Inequality



Waterfall scenario


Passive Participation

Equality

The four scenarios suggest four different paths for Kenya's youth. The question is not whether they will happen but, what we should do if any of these possibilities occurred?

We are ALL standing at a crossroads.

Each one of us, citizens and leaders must choose how we walk forward.



*'Improbable possibilities
should be preferable to
probable possibilities'*

Henry Indangasi



Institute of
Economic Affairs

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